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I. INTRODUCTION
A. Russia + Ukraine = A Cold Europe . . .
Do you remember how you felt on Wednesday, January 7,
2009?  Perhaps you do not.  I know how some Europeans felt — cold.1
That was the day that Russia stopped all natural gas exports to
Ukraine.2  By itself, this was a serious course of action.  However, be-
cause Ukraine is the main transmission corridor for natural gas pipe-
lines shipping gas to Europe,3 the situation commanded worldwide
attention.4
B. History Tends to Repeat Itself . . .
The United States experienced two major oil shortages in the
1970s.5  First, the Yom Kippur war of 19736 gave Arab oil-exporting
countries a pretext for implementing an embargo on the shipment of
oil7 to the United States.  Secondly, in 1979, President Jimmy Carter
1 Over 100,000 households and hundreds of factories were without natural-gas
heat, Andrew E. Kramer, Russia Restores Gas to Ukraine, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 21,
2009.  A disagreement between Russia and Ukraine over the price paid by Ukraine
for natural gas and the terms of transit was the cause of the shutoff, id.
2 Stephen Castle & Andrew E. Kramer, European Union Steps Into Gas Dispute
and Will Monitor Flows in Ukraine, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 8, 2009, at A6.
3 Turning the Gas Tap Back On, ECONOMIST, Jan. 12, 2009, available at http://
www.economist.com/agenda/displaystory.cfm?story_id=E1_TNJNTVRJ&source=
login_payBarrier. Eighty percent of all gas shipments from Russia to Europe go
through Ukraine. Id.
4 Castle & Kramer, supra note 2, at A6.
5 DONALD W. JONES & PAUL N. LEIBY, THE MACROECONOMIC IMPACTS OF OIL PRICE
SHOCKS: A REVIEW OF LITERATURE AND ISSUES 2 (Oak Ridge National Laboratory
Energy Division Jan. 5, 1995) (draft report, on file with author).
6 See generally U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, BACKGROUND NOTE: ISRAEL, http://www.state.
gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/3581.htm#history (last visited Oct. 30, 2009).
7 U.S. Dep’t of Energy - Fossil Energy: Our History, http://fossil.energy.gov/
aboutus/history (last visited Oct. 30, 2009).
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halted the importation of oil from Iran8 after Iran seized the United
States Embassy in Tehran on November 4, 1979, taking fifty-two peo-
ple hostage.9
II. NATIONAL SECURITY ASSETS
A. Energy as a National Security Asset
Energy, no matter whether it takes the form of petroleum, nat-
ural gas, nuclear, coal, or renewable sources, is an economic and stra-
tegic asset.10  Military power is derived from it.11  Naturally it follows
that energy is a major national security concern.12  Energy exporting
states (see Russia above) are increasingly able to execute their politi-
cal and strategic objectives.13  At the opposite end of the spectrum, en-
ergy importing states—the most dependent being the United
States14—are finding it more difficult to achieve their foreign policy
and national security goals.15
Competition for energy sources among energy importing states
creates a tension in international relations and frustrates foreign pol-
8 Proclamation No. 4702, 44 Fed. Reg. 65, 581 (Nov. 14, 1979).
9 American Experience: Jimmy Carter, PBS.org, http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/amex/
carter/peopleevents/e_hostage.html (last visited Jan. 21, 2010).
10 U.N. Conf. on Trade and Dev. [UNCTAD], Trade Agreements, Petroleum and
Energy Policies, 14, UNCTAD/ITCD/TSB/9 (2000), http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/
itcdtsb9_en.pdf (last visited Oct. 30, 2009) [hereinafter UNCTAD Report].
11 See id.
12 See COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, NATIONAL SECURITY CONSEQUENCES OF
U.S. OIL DEPENDENCY, INDEPENDENT TASK FORCE REPORT NO. 58, at 3 (2006),
http://www.cfr.org/publication/11683/national_security_consequences_of_us_oil_
dependency.html?breadcrumb=%2Fpublication%2Fby_type%2Ftask_force_report
(last visited Oct. 30, 2009) [hereinafter CFR REPORT].
13 Id.
14 U.S. Energy Information Administration, Country Energy Profiles, http://tonto.
eia.doe.gov/country/index.cfm (last visited Oct. 30, 2009).  The top five oil net im-
porting countries in 2008 were (in thousand barrels per day): (1) United States -
10,984; (2) Japan - 4,652; (3) China - 3,858; (4) Germany - 2,418; (5) South Korea -
2,144, id.  The top five oil consuming countries in 2008 were (in thousand barrels
per day): (1) United States - 19,498; (2) China - 7,831; (3) Japan - 4,785; (4) India -
2,962; (5) Russia- 2,916, id.  The top five total primary energy consuming countries
in 2007 were (in quadrillion Btu (British thermal unit)): (1) United States - 101.6;
(2) China - 77.8; (3) Russia - 30.4; (4) Japan - 22.5; (5) India - 19.1, U.S. Energy
Information Administration, International Energy Statistics, Total Primary En-
ergy Consumption, http://tonto.eia.doe.gov/cfapps/ipdbproject/iedindex3.cfm?tid=
44&pid=44&aid=2&cid=&syid=2005&eyid=2007&unit=QBTU (last visited Oct.
30, 2009).
15 CFR REPORT, supra note 12, at 3.
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icy execution.16  An example is the recent investment made by China
in the African state of Sudan.  China is Sudan’s most important trad-
ing partner, and the China National Petroleum Corporation operates
oilfields in Sudan.17
Sudan, however, is a model of instability and corruption.  Since
its independence in 1956, it has experienced two civil wars and is cur-
rently engaged in a conflict in its Darfur region that has claimed the
lives of 200,000.18  Transparency International’s Corruption Percep-
tions Index 2008 assigns Sudan a score of 1.6 out of 10, designating it
as a state with widespread corruption.19  In response to the violence in
Darfur, the United States imposed economic sanctions in May 2007.20
The United States also classifies Sudan as a state sponsor of terror-
ism.21  It is most likely that both China and the United States want
peace in Sudan; however, their respective foreign policy approaches
could not be farther apart.  Whereas China opts to invest in Sudan, the
United States imposes sanctions.
B. Energy Security
To reduce the risks that energy dependency imposes on na-
tional security objectives, a country must make energy security an es-
sential element of its national security policy.22  Energy security is
defined as having an energy supply that meets or exceeds demand, is
reliable, and is provided at a reasonable cost.23  Disruptions and
shortages in energy production, transmission, and distribution can
arise unexpectedly, making absolute energy security unattainable.24
Therefore, energy security is a form of risk management.25
16 Id.
17  There be Dragons, ECONOMIST, Nov. 6, 2008, available at http://www.economist.
com/world/asia/displaystory.cfm?story_id=E1_TNVSDVRS.
18 Central Intelligence Agency, The World Factbook - Sudan, https://www.cia.gov/
library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/su.html (last visited Oct. 30, 2009).
19 Transparency International, 2008 Corruption Perceptions Index, http://www.
transparency.org/policy_research/surveys_indices/cpi/2008 (last visited Oct. 30,
2009).  The scores range from the “highly corrupt” at zero to the “highly clean” at
ten, id.
20 U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, BACKGROUND NOTE: SUDAN, http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/
bgn/5424.htm#relations (last visited Oct. 30, 2009).
21 Id.
22 See CFR REPORT, supra note 12, at 3; INTERNATIONAL ENERGY AGENCY, WORLD
ENERGY OUTLOOK 2007, 161 (2007), http://www.iea.org/textbase/nppdf/free/2007/
weo_2007.pdf [hereinafter IEA OUTLOOK 2007].
23 See CFR REPORT, supra note 12, at 3; IEA OUTLOOK 2007, supra note 22, at 161.
24 IEA OUTLOOK 2007, supra note 22, at 161.
25 Id.
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Energy security is a public good which means that as one party
benefits from it no other party suffers a corresponding detriment.26
All entities involved in the energy supply chain benefit from energy
security, regardless of whether they supported it.27  No individual en-
tity in the energy supply chain, however, has the ability to ensure ab-
solute security.28  Consequently, it is up to governments to ensure that
all entities in the energy supply chain are contributing in accordance
with its energy security policy.29
Many governments incorporate four core elements into their
energy security policy.30  First, the policy must provide for investment
in energy infrastructure, to include production, processing, transporta-
tion, and storage.31  Second, energy efficiency should be encouraged to
mitigate demand growth.32  Third, the policy should provide for multi-
ple energy sources and increase the number of market participants to
boost the reliability of supply.33  Fourth, the laws, regulations, and
policies that govern and affect the energy market—including the con-
duct of the energy market itself—must be open to study and inspection
by current and potential market participants.34
C. Roadmap for U.S. Energy Security Policy
In 2006, the Council on Foreign Relations issued a report enti-
tled National Security Consequences of U.S. Oil Dependency.35  The
goal of the report was to analyze how U.S. dependence on imported
energy affected its foreign policy.36  The report focused its analysis on
petroleum imports,37 but its recommendations apply to energy in
general.38
26 Id.
27 Id.
28 Id.
29 Id.
30 Id. at 162.
31 Id.
32 Id.
33 Id.
34 Id.
35 CFR REPORT, supra note 12, at xii.
36 Id. at xi.
37 Id. at 3.
38 Peter Mandelson, Former European Union Trade Commissioner, Trade Policy
and Stable, Secure and Sustainable Energy, Address at a Conference on Strategic
Energy Policy 3 (Nov. 21, 2006), http://ec.europa.eu/commission_barroso/ashton/
speeches_articles/sppm133_en.htm (last visited Nov. 21, 2006) (“I know that the
energy issue looks different depending on from where you are looking at it.  But
regardless of whether you are an importer or exporter, whether you work in oil
and gas, or in renewables or nuclear energy, the features of energy markets are
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The report advocated for a stronger U.S. energy security pol-
icy.39  Five recommendations were provided in hopes of strengthening
U.S. policy.40  First, the report recommended that the United States
adjust its domestic energy policy to include efforts to reduce consump-
tion of “petroleum products.”41  Two ways to reduce consumption are to
foster new technologies and to improve existing technologies.42  The
report also recognized that technology alone is insufficient to ade-
quately reduce consumption.43  Therefore the report suggested the use
of a tax-based measure to shift consumer behavior toward the use of
public transportation.44
Second, the report encouraged the United States to work to-
ward a more fair, efficient, and transparent world energy market.45
Regulations, tariffs, and subsidies must be used in a responsible man-
ner so that market operations are uninhibited.46  The basic economic
laws of supply and demand must be allowed to govern the market.47
Third, the report advocated for a reliable and secure energy in-
frastructure.48  Transmission infrastructure is critical in all facets of
the energy cycle because energy is useless if one cannot move it from
the generator to the consumer.
Fourth, the report called on the United States to insist that
energy exporting countries manage revenue derived from energy in a
wise and prudent fashion.49  Good governance of income will foster po-
litical stability and enhance living standards.50  The report states that
political stability is a prerequisite to attracting investment in the
country.51  Investments benefit the country and its citizens by increas-
essentially the same.  Decisions are for the very long term.  Consumer demand is
price inelastic.  And governments are tempted to intervene to protect their na-
tional security interests.”).
39 CFR REPORT, supra note 12, at 6.
40 Id.
41 Id.
42 Id. at 7.
43 Id. at 6–7.  The report finds that “no strategy [to reduce petroleum consump-
tion] will be effective without higher prices for transportation fuels or regulatory
incentives to use more efficient vehicles,” id.
44 Id. at 6–7.
45 Id. at 8.
46 Id.
47 Id. (stating that “[t]he United States should continue to urge governments in all
countries to reduce subsidies and deregulate the prices of oil and gas where they
have been held below world market levels.”).
48 Id. at 9.
49 Id.
50 Id. at 10.
51 Id.
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ing their social and economic standing.52  At the same time, as social
and economic reforms plant the seeds of democracy, the United States
realizes its foreign policy goal of encouraging democratic
governments.53
Finally, the report challenged the United States to revamp its
national security staff to include a new energy security directorate
that will handle energy specific issues.54  The report provided that en-
ergy issues are technical and complex; therefore, having qualified per-
sonnel to handle such issues, and including these issues in the already
broad scope of national security, is a necessity to the policy making
process.55
D. The Impossibility of U.S. Energy Independence
One misconception that plagues the discussion of energy secur-
ity and trade is the belief that the United States can avoid this topic
simply by becoming energy independent.56  Energy independence for
the United States is unachievable in the foreseeable future.57  The
United States produced 10% of the world’s oil while consuming more
than double (23%) of that amount in 2008.58  The reason for this is that
transportation needs accounted for over a quarter of the total United
States energy consumption in 2008.59  Ninety-five percent of the total
energy consumed by the transportation sector comes from petro-
leum.60  Seventy-one percent of the total of import and domestic sup-
plies of petroleum go to the transportation sector.61  The United States
52 Id.
53 Id.
54 Id.
55 Id. at 10–11.
56 Id. at 4.
57 Id.; see also Tom Kenworthy, Energy Independence May be a Pipe Dream, USA
TODAY, Oct. 24, 2004, available at http://www.usatoday.com/news/politicselections/
nation/issues/2004-10-24-energy-independence_x.htm.
58 ENERGY INFORMATION ADMINISTRATION, ENERGY IN BRIEF: HOW DEPENDENT ARE
WE ON FOREIGN OIL?, http://tonto.eia.doe.gov/energy_in_brief/foreign_oil_depen
dence.cfm (last visited Oct. 31, 2009).
59 ENERGY INFORMATION ADMINISTRATION, FIGURE 2.1A ENERGY CONSUMPTION BY
SECTOR OVERVIEW, http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/aer/pdf/pages/sec2_4.pdf (last vis-
ited Oct. 31. 2009).  End-Use Sector Shares of Total Consumption, 2008 graph
shows the following: industrial - 31%; transportation - 28%; residential - 22%; com-
mercial - 19%.  Id.
60 ENERGY INFORMATION ADMINISTRATION, U.S. PRIMARY ENERGY CONSUMPTION BY
SOURCE AND SECTOR, 2008, http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/aer/pecss_diagram.html
(last visited Oct. 31, 2009).
61 Id.
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imports approximately 58% of its petroleum needs.62  It is simply not
feasible to use a domestic energy alternative as a substitute for im-
ported petroleum absent a significant reduction in the transportation
sector requirement.63
III. PROBLEM STATEMENT
Countries throughout the world have the goal of achieving en-
ergy security.  The challenge they face is creating the proper legal re-
gime to manage energy—a national security asset—to achieve this
goal.  This article discusses how the implementation of World Trade
Organization (“WTO”) principles and agreements can be a means to
promote energy security.
IV. WOLRD TRADE ORGANIZATION
A. Background and Politics
The WTO officially became a legally recognized organization on
January 1, 1995.64  Its roots, however, extend to the period immedi-
ately following the Second World War.65  In 1947, the United States
led a group of countries with the common goal of establishing an insti-
tution that would promote free trade.66  Although they did not realize
their goal of the creation of an international institution, they did draft
and implement a new treaty entitled the General Agreement on Tar-
iffs and Trade (“GATT”).67  The GATT sought to eliminate protection-
ist economic practices and set forth a collection of rules to govern
international trade in goods.68  Forty-eight years after the implemen-
tation of the GATT, the Member countries of the GATT, during the
Uruguay Round of trade negotiations, transformed their de facto re-
gime under the GATT into the de jure WTO.69
62 ENERGY INFORMATION ADMINISTRATION, ENERGY IN BRIEF, supra note 58.
63 CFR REPORT, supra note 12, at 14 (stating that “[l]iquid fuels are essential to
the nation’s transportation system.  Barring draconian measures, the United
States will depend on imported oil for a significant fraction of its transportation
fuel needs for at least several decades.”).
64 WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, UNDERSTANDING THE WTO 10 (4th ed. 2008),
http://www.wto.int/english/res_e/publications_e/understanding_wto_e.htm (last
visited Nov. 6, 2009) [hereinafter UNDERSTANDING].
65 DANIEL C.K. CHOW & THOMAS J. SCHOENBAUM, INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW:
PROBLEMS, CASES, AND MATERIALS 20 (2008).
66 Id.
67 Id.
68 Id.
69 UNDERSTANDING, supra note 64, at 10.
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Although petroleum products are a “good” for the purposes of
the GATT,70 Member countries have treated petroleum goods as being
outside of the GATT scope.71  At the time the GATT was negotiated,
most of the world’s petroleum fields were under the control of corpora-
tions owned by the citizens of the United States, the United Kingdom,
the Netherlands, and France.72  Because these countries had just
emerged from the Second World War, they were reluctant to include
strategic assets, namely petroleum products, within the scope of the
GATT.73  This special treatment, that is, non-treatment under the
GATT, was because the contracting parties did not want to politicize
such a strategic asset.74
B. Doha Development Agenda
For approximately fifty years, the issue of trade in energy
goods and services was avoided based on its strategic-asset classifica-
tion.  In 2001, however, the WTO took a major step toward the inclu-
sion of energy as an officially recognized sector of trade.75  The Doha
Development Agenda (DDA),76 a structured negotiations program in
which WTO Member governments discussed trade issues, expressly in-
cluded the topic of trade in energy services.77  These negotiations be-
gan in 2001 and were originally set to close on January 1, 2005.78
Disagreements over agricultural issues prevented the WTO from
70 See Pascal Lamy, Dir.-Gen., World Trade Org., Address at the 20th World En-
ergy Congress in Rome: Doha Round Will Benefit Energy Trade (Nov. 16, 2007),
available at http://www.wto.int/english/news_e/sppl_e/sppl80_e.htm (last visited
Nov. 6, 2009).
So the rules of the WTO do not deal with energy as a distinct
sector.  Yet since our basic rules are applicable to all forms of
trade, they also apply to trade in energy goods and services.  And
these rules can be enforced through the WTO dispute settlement
mechanism even if they were not negotiated with energy in
mind.
Id.
71 UNCTAD Report, supra note 10, at 14–15.
72 Id. at 14.
73 See id.
74 Id. at 14–15.
75 Lamy, supra note 70 (stating “[t]he first area where energy stands explicitly on
the Doha [Development] agenda is the services negotiations.  For the first time
Members are discussing energy as a specific services sector.”).
76 For background information on the DDA, see generally UNDERSTANDING, supra
note 64, at 77.
77 See Special Session of the Council for Trade in Services, Report by the Chair-
man to the Trade Negotiations Committee, TN/S/23, at annex B, § 11 (Nov. 28,
2005).
78 See UNDERSTANDING, supra note 64, at 77.
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meeting this deadline.79  In September 2009, trade ministers from
Member governments stated that it was their goal to finalize the DDA
in 2010.80
The DDA is particularly important because it represents an op-
portunity to adopt specific energy services activities under the General
Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS).  For the purposes of GATS,
the WTO Services Sectoral Classification List81 (W/120) contains all
the services activities eligible for market access and national treat-
ment protections.  While this list includes sectors such as business and
transportation, it does not include a sector for energy services.82  A
separate energy services sector may be added through the DDA.83
The United States,84 Canada,85 the European Communities,86
Venezuela,87 Japan,88 and Cuba89 have each submitted a communica-
tion containing their proposed energy services additions to the W/120.
The United States’ proposal is the most detailed and comprehensive
out of the group.90  It proposes to add an energy sector to the W/120.
The energy sector is divided into five broad categories; each category
will contain subcategories with corresponding energy services.91  It is
important to note that the energy services listed in the proposal apply
to all energy sources (unless otherwise noted) to include oil, natural
gas, coal, renewables, nuclear, and electricity.92
79 See id.
80 Vikas Bajaj, Trade Talks to Resume, But Divides Remain, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 5,
2009, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/09/05/business/global/05trade.
html.
81 See generally GATT Secretariat, Services Sectoral Classification List,
MTN.GNS/W/120 (July 10, 1991).
82 See id.
83 See generally Special Session of the Council for Trade in Services, supra note
77.
84 See Communication from the United States, Classification of Energy Services,
S/CSC/W/27 (May 18, 2000).
85 See Communication from Canada, Initial Negotiating Proposal on Oil and Gas
Services, S/CSS/W/58 (Mar. 14, 2001).
86 See Communication from the European Communities and their Member States,
GATS 2000: Energy Services, S/CSS/W/60 (Mar. 23, 2001).
87 See Communication from Venezuela, Negotiating Proposal on Energy Services,
S/CSS/W/69 (Mar. 29, 2001).
88 See Communication from Japan, Negotiation Proposal on Energy Services Sup-
plement, S/CSS/W/42/Suppl.3 (Oct. 4, 2001).
89 See Communication from Cuba, Negotiating Proposal on Energy Services, S/
CSS/W/144 (Mar. 22, 2002).
90 See Communication from the United States, supra note 84.
91 See id. ¶ 3.
92 Id. at Attachment A, n.1.
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There are three main reasons for the initiation of WTO negoti-
ations on energy.  First, governments realized that the lack of trade
agreements on energy restrict their foreign policy options.93  Without
uniform trade rules, petroleum exporting states can impose their for-
eign policy goals with greater success—especially where their goals
are counter to those of the United States.  Secondly, it is well accepted
that market economies are very good at the efficient allocation of re-
sources.94  WTO rules contribute to market effectiveness by governing
these markets in a transparent and predictable manner.95  Third,
before the 1990s, most energy utilities were state-owned and vertically
integrated.96  The state owned the complete energy system from gener-
ation to transmission to distribution.97  Liberalization of these state-
owned utilities has opened up numerous opportunities for private com-
panies to compete for projects in generation, transmission, and
distribution.98
C. WTO Trade Agreements
Three WTO trade agreements govern the main areas of trade
regulated by the WTO.99
1. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
The first agreement is the GATT.100  The GATT is the oldest of
all the WTO agreements.  It was signed in October 1947 as a result of
an effort to promote economic cooperation among its Member states.101
93 See CFR REPORT, supra note 12, at 3 (stating that “[m]ajor energy consumers—
notably the United States, but other countries as well—are finding that their
growing dependence on imported energy increases their strategic vulnerability
and constrains their ability to pursue a broad range of foreign policy and national
security objectives.”).
94 UNDERSTANDING, supra note 64, at 14.
95 At the 20th World Congress on Energy in 2007, WTO Director General Lamy
stated that “[a]s noted by your in-coming Council Chairman, markets remain the
most efficient way to allocate resources.  But markets must be governed by trans-
parent and predictable rules.  And this may be where the WTO, as a forum for the
negotiation and enforcement of multilateral trade rules has a role to play,” Lamy,
supra note 70.
96 GATS Secretariat, Energy Services: Background Note by the Secretariat, ¶¶ 3,
20, S/C/W/52 (Sept. 9, 1998).
97 Id. ¶ 3.
98 Id. ¶¶ 3–4.
99 UNDERSTANDING, supra note 64, at 10.
100 See generally General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat.
A-11, 55 U.N.T.S. 187, available at http://www.jurisint.org/pub/06/en/doc/05.htm
[hereinafter GATT].
101 UNDERSTANDING, supra note 64, at 15.
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The venerable GATT focuses on trade in goods, where trade in goods is
the most prevalent channel of trade.102  Prior to the establishment of
the WTO in 1995, the GATT was the only multilateral agreement gov-
erning international trade.103
2. General Agreement on Trade in Services
The second agreement is the General Agreement on Trade in
Services (GATS).104  The GATS came into effect in 1995.105  The GATS
is the only international trade agreement covering trade in services.106
The significance of the GATS cannot be understated because it covers
all types of services.107  The services trade sector is the fastest growing
sector of the world economy.108
3. Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights
The third agreement of the WTO framework is the Agreement
on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS),109
which was also adopted in 1995.110  As knowledge and advanced tech-
nology products constitute a greater share of international trade, the
need for adequate protection of the ideas and expertise embodied in
these products increases.111
V. WTO FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES
WTO agreements rest on a foundation of fundamental princi-
ples including: (1) trade without discrimination; (2) free trade; (3) pre-
dictability in trade; (4) fair competition; and (5) economic
development.112  Non-discriminatory trade is pursued through the use
of two core obligations: (1) the most-favored-nation (MFN) principle;
and (2) the national treatment principle.113  The MFN principle stands
for the requirement that a WTO Member state must afford to all of its
WTO Member state trading partners the same, or equal, treatment
102 See CHOW & SCHOENBAUM, supra note 65, at 354.
103 Id. at 11.
104 The General Agreement on Trade in Services, Apr. 15, 1994, Annex 1B, 33
I.L.M. 1167 (1994) [hereinafter GATS].
105 UNDERSTANDING, supra note 64, at 37.
106 Id. at 33.
107 Id.
108 Id.
109 Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15,
1994, Annex 1C, 33 I.L.M. 1197 (1994).
110 UNDERSTANDING, supra note 64, at 39.
111 See id.
112 Id. at 10–12.
113 CHOW & SCHOENBAUM, supra note 65, at 143.
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regarding trade advantages.114  MFN produces a result where all
WTO Members receive the same treatment; therefore, no Member
state has an advantage over the other.115  Article I of the GATT enu-
merates the MFN principle.116  The national treatment principle
stands for the requirement that a WTO Member state cannot afford
more favorable trade treatment to its domestic products and producers
as compared to other WTO Member states.117  Both the MFN principle
and the national treatment principle were first included in the GATT
but continue to play a major role in the GATS and TRIPS.118
A. Most-Favored-Nation Principle
1. Origins
From its origin in the twelfth century through the nineteenth
century, the MFN principle had an opposite effect than its current ef-
fect under the WTO.119  During its history, certain trading partners
received favorable treatment due to the friendly relations between two
states.120  As a result, a limited number of trading partners enjoyed
such trade advantages.
2. Current Operation and Elements
Today, as used in the WTO framework, the MFN principle
gives all WTO trading partners the same treatment; equal treatment
is the norm and any treatment varying from the norm is the excep-
tion.121  The MFN principle, as embodied in Article I of the GATT, con-
tains two distinct elements.122  The first element is that the MFN
principle applies to any trade advantage that a Member country may
afford to any other country, where the other country need not be a
WTO Member.123
The second element is that the Member country affording such
an advantage must immediately and unconditionally grant the same
advantage to WTO Member countries that produce like products.124
Some of the advantages of the MFN principle include the protection of
114 Id.; GATT, supra note 100, pt. I, art. I, ¶ 1; see also GATT, supra note 100, pt.
II, art. III, ¶¶ 1–2.
115 CHOW & SCHOENBAUM, supra note 65, at 143.
116 See GATT, supra note 100, pt. I, art. I, ¶ 1, pt. II, art. III, ¶¶ 1–2.
117 CHOW & SCHOENBAUM, supra note 65, at 143.
118 Id.
119 Id. at 144.
120 Id.
121 Id.
122 Id. at 145.
123 Id.
124 Id.
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trade concessions against a reduction in value, promotion of free and
fair trade, and protection against corruption within a multilateral
trading system.125  Along with these advantages come some disadvan-
tages, which include the opportunity for other states to act as free rid-
ers on the concessions of other countries, that is, the absence of a
guarantee of reciprocity of concessions where one country may be af-
fording a greater advantage than it receives in return.126
One may distinguish the MFN principle from the national
treatment principle by the end result of their application.127  The MFN
principle affects external trade practices (e.g., tariffs, customs duties)
while national treatment affects internal trade practices (e.g., internal
taxes).128  Although the language of the MFN principle and the na-
tional treatment principle varies in the GATT, GATS, and TRIPS, the
effect is the same.129
3. Scope
a. Border and Internal Charges
It is important for any party to a trade transaction to under-
stand the scope of the MFN principle.130  The GATT Panel Report, Bel-
gian Family Allowances, is illustrative of the reach of the MFN
principle.131  In Belgian Family Allowances, trade delegations from
Norway and Denmark filed a complaint with the GATT Panel alleging
a violation of the MFN principle by Belgium.132  Certain goods that
had been imported into Belgium and cleared customs were subse-
quently charged a levy at the time of purchase of the goods by certain
Belgian public bodies.133  This charge was disguised as an internal
charge rather than an import charge.134  Belgium, however, did not
apply this levy in a uniform manner, but rather provided an exception
to the levy for a limited number of states.135  The panel considered
whether this internal charge placed upon certain products violated the
GATT.136  The Panel held that the levy violated the GATT’s MFN prin-
125 Id.
126 Id.
127 Id. at 143.
128 Id.
129 Id. at 144.
130 Id. at 147.
131 Report of the Panel, Belgian Family Allowances (Allocations Familiales) (Nov.
7, 1952), GATT B.I.S.D. (1st Supp.) at 59 (1953); see also CHOW & SCHOENBAUM,
supra note 65, at 147–49.
132 Report of the Panel, supra note 131, ¶ 1.
133 Id. ¶¶ 1–2.
134 Id. ¶ 2.
135 Id. ¶ 3.
136 See id. ¶¶ 3–7.
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ciple.137  The Panel ruled that the levy must be either completely re-
moved or applied in a non-discriminatory manner to comply with the
MFN principle.138  The Panel decision stands for the rule that the
MFN principle applies to both charges upon imported goods at the
time of importation and to any subsequently applied internal
charges.139
b. Like Products
Another important element of the MFN principle is the “like
product” designation.140  The MFN principle applies only where the
products are considered to be like products and, accordingly, products
that do not qualify as like products do not enjoy MFN treatment.141
The GATT Panel explored the issue of like product designation in the
Report of Treatment by Germany of Imports of Sardines.142  The issue
before the Panel was whether Germany violated the MFN principle
with its application of non-uniform duties on certain types of fish.143
In order to address this issue, the Panel had to decide whether
the three types of fish involved were like products and, if so, only then
would MFN treatment be required.144  The Panel held that the three
types of fish in question were not like products for purposes of deter-
mining MFN treatment.145  In making its determination, the Panel
recognized Germany’s consistent treatment of the three types of fish as
separate and distinct.146  A determination of like product status must
be performed on a case-by-case basis where, as the Panel illustrated in
this instance, both the treatment of the products by the states in the
dispute, along with the products themselves, must be taken into
consideration.147
137 Id. ¶ 8.
138 Id. ¶ 3.
139 See CHOW & SCHOENBAUM, supra note 65, at 147–49.
140 Id. at 150.
141 Id.
142 Report of the Panel, Treatment by Germany of Imports of Sardines (Oct. 31,
1952), GATT B.I.S.D. (1st Supp.) at 53 (1953); see also CHOW & SCHOENBAUM,
supra note 65, at 150.
143 Report of the Panel, Treatment by Germany of Imports of Sardines, supra note
142, ¶ 10.
144 Id. ¶ 11.
145 Id. ¶ 13.
146 Id.
147 See id. ¶ 12.
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c. De Facto Discrimination
The MFN principle also operates to prevent de facto discrimi-
nation.148  De facto discrimination was the subject of the WTO Appel-
late Body Report of Canada–Certain Measures Affecting the
Automotive Industry.149  De facto discrimination occurs where a Mem-
ber country imposes certain criteria that allow for exceptions to duties
or import charges where such exceptions are not expressly based on a
country of origin, but rather some economic criteria.150  Canada insti-
tuted an import duty exception, the Motor Vehicle Tariff Order, which
applied to the importation of automobiles.151
The issue before the Panel was whether Canada’s automobile
tariff exception, which was expressly origin-neutral in application,
may have operated inconsistent with MFN principles.152  The Panel
found, and the Appellate Body agreed, that the actual use of the im-
port duty exemption produced a discriminatory effect where only a
very small number of automobile manufacturers were afforded the ex-
emption and because of this, enjoyed an advantage over the vast ma-
jority of other automobile manufacturers.153  Therefore, MFN
treatment also applies to origin-neutral import charges that, once im-
plemented, have a de facto discriminatory effect by affording certain
products an advantage over other like products.
B. National Treatment Principle
1. Operation
The second core WTO principle is the national treatment prin-
ciple154 which is found in GATT Article III.155  The national treatment
principle means that no less favorable treatment can be afforded to
imported goods as compared to domestic goods by the importing
state.156  This principle prevents an importing state from implement-
148 CHOW & SCHOENBAUM, supra note 65, at 156.
149 Appellate Body Report, Canada—Certain Measures Affecting the Automotive
Industry, WT/DS139/AB/R, 142/AB/R (June 19, 2000); see also id. at 153.
150 Appellate Body Report, Canada—Certain Measures Affecting the Automotive
Industry, supra note 149, ¶ 78 (stating that the words of Article I:1 do not restrict
its scope only to cases in which the failure to accord an ‘advantage’ to like products
of all other Members appears on the face of the measure. . . . [W]e cannot accept
Canada’s argument that Article I:1 does not apply to measures which, on their
face, are ‘origin-neutral.’ ”).
151 Id. at ¶¶ 7, 9.
152 Id. at ¶ 77.
153 Id. ¶ 81.
154 See GATT, supra note 100, pt. I, art. I.
155 See GATT, supra note 100, pt. II., art. III.
156 See GATT, supra note 100, pt. I, art. I.
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ing discriminatory measures upon imported goods after the goods have
passed customs and been subject to the applicable tariffs.157  Without
the national treatment principle, a state could impose few or no tariffs
on imports, and then could assess large fees against the imported
goods at a later time.158  Every state has an inherent and reasonable
interest in promoting domestic goods and products because their suc-
cess is a key component in the prosperity of the state itself.159
2. Elements of Paragraph Two
The WTO Appellate Body Report for Japan – Taxes on Alco-
holic Beverages interprets the national treatment principle as it ap-
plies to domestic taxes and charges.160  The Panel had to determine
whether a Japanese Liquor Tax Law violated the national treatment
principle.161  In making this determination, the first issue confronted
by the Panel was whether shochu, a Japanese alcoholic beverage, and
vodka are like products, and therefore whether the higher domestic
taxes on imported vodka as compared to shochu constituted a violation
of GATT Article III:2, first sentence.162  The second issue was whether
the non-uniform taxes placed on shochu, as compared to other im-
ported alcoholic beverages, violated GATT Article III:2, second
sentence.163
The Panel reasoned that if the domestic and imported goods
are like products and the domestic goods are taxed at a rate lower than
the imported products, then the tax violated GATT Article III:2, first
sentence.164  The Panel also determined that the criteria required to
violate GATT Article III:2, first sentence, is different from that of the
second sentence.165  The first sentence is to be construed to encompass
a more narrow range of products where the products in question must
be like products.166  The second sentence is to be construed to encom-
pass a broader range of products because the like product requirement
is not present.167
157 CHOW & SCHOENBAUM, supra note 65, at 159.
158 Id.
159 Id. at 159–60.
160 Appellate Body Report, Japan—Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages, WT/DS8/AB/R,
WT/DS10/AB/R, WT/DS11/AB/R (Oct. 4, 1996); see also CHOW & SCHOENBAUM,
supra note 65, at 161.
161 Appellate Body Report, Japan—Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages, supra note 160,
at 3–4.
162 Id.
163 Id.
164 Id. at 17.
165 Id. at 24.
166 Id. at 19.
167 Id. at 24.
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The Appellate Body held that the Panel correctly determined
that imported vodka and domestically produced shochu are like prod-
ucts and that the taxes on the vodka exceeded those of the shochu,
thereby constituting a violation of GATT Article III:2, first sen-
tence.168  The excess amount need not be large and may be of the
slightest amount to constitute a violation.169
In taking up the second issue, the Panel listed three elements
that are required to make up a violation of GATT Article III:2, second
sentence.170  The first element is that the imported goods and the do-
mestic goods must be either “directly competitive or substitutable
products” that are in competition with each other.171  The second ele-
ment is that such products are “not similarly taxed.”172  The third ele-
ment is that the non-uniform taxation must be applied in a manner
which results in the protection of the domestic product.173  Although
the Appellate Body disagreed with the Panel’s method of a combined
analysis of the second and third elements, the Appellate Body never-
theless agreed with the Panel’s final decision that the Japanese Liquor
Tax Law was inconsistent with GATT Article III:2, second sentence.174
3. Internal Regulations
A sovereign state has an inherent right to regulate its internal
affairs including the regulation of domestic and imported goods.175
Energy products and services are, in general, subject to extensive gov-
ernmental regulation.176  The regulations are in place to ensure that
the government’s national security and public policy objectives, such
as consumer health and safety, reliable service, and environmental
168 Id. at 23–24.
169 Id. at 24.
170 Id. at 25.
171 Id. at 25.  The evaluation of whether two products are directly competitive or
substitutable products must be evaluated on a case-by-case basis where the char-
acteristics to be evaluated include the physicality, uses, tariff classifications, and
the market of the product.  Id. at 25–26.
172 Id. at 25.  The second element of dissimilar taxation requires that the imported
product be taxed at a higher rate than the domestic product where the difference
must be greater than a de minimis amount. Id. at 28.
173 Id at 25.  The third element does not require intent to confer an advantage
upon the domestic product; it is a question of whether some advantage did result
from the application of the tax.  Id. at 28–29.
174 Id. at 32–33.
175 CHOW & SCHOENBAUM, supra note 65, at 177.
176 GATS Secretariat, supra note 96, ¶ 62.
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protection, are met.177  In certain circumstances, however, where regu-
lations affect domestic and imported products differently, internal reg-
ulation may be inconsistent with the national treatment principle
under GATT, Article III:4.178
In Italian Discrimination Against Imported Agricultural Ma-
chinery, the GATT Panel took up the issue of whether loans that pro-
vided more favorable terms for purchases of domestic (Italian) farm
machinery as opposed to imported machinery were a violation of the
national treatment principle.179  The Panel recognized that the inten-
tion of Article III was to ensure that imported products, once they
passed customs and were placed on the importing state’s market, were
to remain free from discrimination.180  The text of Article III indicates
that its application is not limited to laws that directly regulate the sale
of goods but it is also applicable to laws that may have a negative im-
pact on the internal market conditions, such as loan interest rates that
are related to the goods in question.181  The Panel found that the
favorable interest rate was a form of protection for domestically manu-
factured agricultural machinery by the Italian government, and there-
fore it was inconsistent with the national treatment principle.182
Another example of the how government regulation may con-
flict with the national treatment principle is contained in the Appel-
late Body Report of Korea – Measures Affecting Imports of Fresh,
Chilled and Frozen Beef.183  The issue before the Panel was whether
Korea’s regulation of beef, which required domestic and imported beef
to each have its own retail facility, was a violation of the national
treatment principle.184  The Panel held that the Korean system was a
violation of Article III:4.185
177 “The energy sector is generally highly regulated in order to protect important
policy objectives such as health and safety, environmental protection, universal
service and consumer protection.” Id.
178 CHOW & SCHOENBAUM, supra note 65, at 177; GATT, supra note 100, pt. II, art.
III, ¶ 4.
179 Report of the Panel, Italian Discrimination Against Imported Agricultural Ma-
chinery, ¶¶ 1–2, L/833 (Oct. 23, 1958), GATT B.I.S.D. (7th supp.) at 60 (1959); see
also CHOW & SCHOENBAUM, supra note 65, at 178.
180 Report of the Panel, Italian Discrimination Against Imported Agricultural Ma-
chinery, supra note 179, ¶ 11.
181 Id. ¶ 12.
182 Id. ¶ 16.
183 Appellate Body Report, Korea—Measures Affecting Imports of Fresh, Chilled
and Frozen Beef, WT/DS161/AB/R, WT/DS169/AB/R (Dec. 11, 2000); see also CHOW
& SCHOENBAUM, supra note 65, at 182.
184 Appellate Body Report, Korea—Measures Affecting Imports of Fresh, Chilled
and Frozen Beef, supra note 183, ¶ 3.
185 Id. ¶ 148.
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There are three elements that make up a violation of Article
III:4 of the national treatment principle.186  The first element is that
both the domestic and imported goods must satisfy the classification of
“ ‘like products.’”187  The second element is that the law or regulation
in question, as applicable to the imported or domestic goods, must af-
fect the sale, purchase, or other related market activity concerning
such goods as conducted within the importing state.188  The third ele-
ment is that the law or regulation must impose less favorable treat-
ment on the imported good.189
The Appellate Body first highlights the fact that a mere differ-
ence in treatment between the imported good and domestic good does
not, by itself, constitute less favorable treatment.190  The separate re-
tail systems, as imposed by law, do not alone constitute a violation of
Article III:4.191  To determine whether the conduct of the importing
state is inconsistent with the national treatment principle, the focus
must be on the “conditions of competition” in which the goods are
sold.192  If the state’s law or regulation imposes unequal conditions of
competition, then the law or regulation is inconsistent with Article
III:4.193  The Korean law here results in a less favorable condition of
competition for imported beef, and therefore violated Article III:4.194
C. Transparency
The MFN and national treatment principles constitute the two
main columns supporting the GATT and the GATS.195  Another attri-
bute worth noting here is that a trade system should be predictable.196
A predictable market allows market participants to trade confidently
and plan out their investments and business activities.197
Two essential elements required for a stable and predictable
trade system are that its Member states must be bound by it and it
must be transparent.198  The first element requires that a Member
state honor or be bound by its tariff rate limitations.199  Such limita-
186 Id. ¶ 133.
187 Id.
188 Id.
189 Id.  Korea appeals only the third element.  Id.
190 Id. ¶ 135.
191 Id.
192 Id. ¶ 137.
193 Id.
194 Id. ¶¶ 146, 148.
195 CHOW & SCHOENBAUM, supra note 65, at 143.
196 UNDERSTANDING, supra note 64, at 10.
197 Id. at 11.
198 Id. at 12.
199 Id.
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tions may be changed only through negotiations with its trading part-
ners and not unilaterally.200  The second element is transparency,
which includes a Member state’s disclosure of its laws, regulations,
and practices affecting trade.201
GATT Article X, titled “Publication and Administration of
Trade Regulations,” plays a leading role in ensuring transparency.202
While the publishing requirement of Article X:1 is self-explanatory,
paragraph 3(a) requires some explanation.  The Panel Report of
United States—Anti-Dumping Measures on Certain Hot-Rolled Steel
Products from Japan, provides a description of the operation and scope
of Article X.203  The dispute centered on anti-dumping measures im-
plemented by the United States against Japan concerning Japanese
hot-rolled steel.204  The issue was whether the United States violated
Article X:3(a) by implementing its anti-dumping measures.205  The
Panel found that the United States did not violate Article X:3(a).206
This Report included a good description of the operation of Ar-
ticle X.  The scope of Article X is limited to those laws or regulations
that are “of general application.”207  For example, an import license
concerning a specific company or specific shipment is not of general
application.208  Additionally, in following previous Appellate Body de-
cisions, the Panel explained that Article X:3(a) does not apply to a
Member country’s laws, regulations, and decisions in themselves, in-
stead it applies to the administration of such laws.209
VI. GENERAL AGREEMENT ON TRADE IN SERVICES
A. Overview
The GATS will play a leading role in national security chal-
lenges.  Indeed, GATS’ role may be larger than that of GATT because
200 Id.
201 Id. at 12.
202 GATT, supra note 100, pt. II, art X ¶¶ 1, 3(a).
203 Panel Report, United States—Anti-Dumping Measures on Certain Hot-Rolled
Steel Products from Japan, WT/DS184/R (Feb. 28, 2001).
204 Id. ¶ 2.1.
205 Id. ¶ 7.262.
206 Id. ¶ 7.277.
207 Id. ¶ 7.266 (citing Panel Report, European Communities—Measures Affecting
the Importation of Certain Poultry Products, ¶¶ 269–70, WT/DS69/R (July 13,
1998)).
208 Id. (citing Panel Report, European Communities—Measures Affecting the Im-
portation of Certain Poultry Products, ¶ 114, WT/DS69/R (July 13, 1998)).
209 Id. ¶ 7.266 (citing Appellate Body Report, European Communities—Regime for
the Importation, Sale and Distribution of Bananas, ¶ 200, WT/DS27/AB/R (Sept.
25, 1997)).
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of the inclusion of energy services in the DDA.210  It is well-known that
United States is dependent on imported energy goods.211  Many are
not aware, however, that the United States maintains a trade surplus;
it is a net exporter, of services.212  The GATS, like the GATT, imposes
obligations on Member states to include the MFN, national treatment,
and transparency principles.213
Differences arise in the manner in which these two trade
agreements apply such principles.214  The GATT applies all three obli-
gations against any discriminatory trade measure.215  In contrast to
the GATT, the GATS contains two categories of obligations: (1) general
obligations in Part II; and (2) specific commitments in Part III.216
B. Part II General Obligations
The MFN and transparency principles lie within the general
obligations.217  These obligations are unconditionally and automati-
cally afforded to other Member countries.218  The MFN principle as
contained in GATS Article II:1 contains a like services requirement.219
The Panel Report for Canada—Certain Measures Affecting the Auto-
motive Industry, provides guidance as to this like services require-
ment.220  The Panel stated that the like services requirement is
satisfied with respect to the actual services provided.221  The charac-
teristics of the entity actually providing the services are not to be
considered.222
210 See Special Session of the Council for Trade in Services, Report by the Chair-
man to the Trade Negotiations Committee, TN/S/23, at annex B, § 11 (Nov. 28,
2005).
211 See text accompanying supra note 14.
212 The United States had exports of services totaling $479,150,000,000 and im-
ports of services of $372,296,000,000 for a surplus of 106,854,000,000,U.N. Conf.
on Trade and Dev. [UNCTAD], Handbook of Statistics Online, http://stats.unctad.
org/Handbook/ReportFolders/ReportFolders.aspx (last visited Nov. 12, 2009).
213 UNDERSTANDING, supra note 64, at 10–11.
214 CHOW & SCHOENBAUM, supra note 65, at 282, 284.
215 See id. at 282.
216 Id. at 281–82.
217 GATS, supra note 104, pt. II, art. II:1–3; GATS, supra note 104, pt. II, art.
III:1.
218 CHOW & SCHOENBAUM, supra note 65, at 282.
219 See GATS, supra note 104, pt. II, art. II:1–3, pt, art. III: 1.
220 Panel Report, Canada—Certain Measures Affecting the Automotive Industry,
WT/DS139/R, WT/DS142/R (Feb. 11, 2000).
221 Id. at ¶ 6.843.
222 Id. at ¶ 6.842.
[T]he nature and the characteristics of wholesale transactions as
such, as well as of each of the different subordinated services
mentioned in the headnote to section 6 of the [UN Central Prod-
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Unlike the GATT MFN principle, Article II:2-3 allows Mem-
bers to limit the reach of this provision.223  These exemptions prevent
free riding by other Member countries.224  Free riding is a two-step
process that begins when country A affords favorable treatment to all
other Member countries.225  The second step occurs when one of the
other Member countries receiving the favorable treatment, say coun-
try C, may not afford country A equal favorable treatment.226  There-
fore, country C is receiving a benefit while country A is subject to a
detriment.227  Using this example, country A may take advantage of
Article II:2-3, to mitigate the detriment it suffers at the hands of coun-
try C.228
C. Part III Specific Commitments
Obligations within the specific commitments section are af-
forded to only those services designated as committed on a country’s
GATS Schedule.229  Market access and national treatment obligations
are classified as specific commitments under GATS.230
1. National Treatment
National treatment is the most important free trade principle
pertaining to services.231  National treatment requirements are sub-
stantially the same under both GATT and GATS; however, GATS al-
lows its Members to limit and condition the reach of the obligation.232
Article XVII provides that the services sectors listed on a Member
country’s Schedule may be subject to the conditions and qualifications
uct Classification system], are “like” when supplied in connection
with wholesale services, irrespective of whether these services
are supplied with respect to bananas of EC and traditional ACP
origin, on the one hand, or with respect to bananas of third-coun-
try or non-traditional ACP origin, on the other.
Id. at ¶ 6.842 (quoting Panel Report, European Communities—Regime for the Im-
portation, Sale and Distribution of Bananas, ¶ 7.322, WT/DS27/R/USA (May 22,
1997)) (emphasis added).
223 CHOW & SCHOENBAUM, supra note 65, at 282.
224 Id.
225 Id.
226 Id. at 283.
227 Id.
228 Id.
229 Id. at 284.
230 GATS, supra note 104, pt. III, arts. XVI & XVII.
231 CHOW & SCHOENBAUM, supra note 65, at 285; GATS, supra note 104, pt. III,
art. XVII:1.
232 CHOW & SCHOENBAUM, supra note 65, at 285.
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also included on its Schedule.233  Therefore, for Member country A to
enjoy full national treatment in country C, country C must first in-
clude the applicable services sector on its Schedule.  Second, country C
must refrain from exercising its right to subject the sector to condi-
tions and qualifications.
2. Market Access
While trade in goods, (i.e., the importation and exportation of
items such as bananas or shoes) is generally straightforward, trade in
services is more ambiguous.  Article I defines trade in services as the
supply of a service in terms of four different scenarios or modes.234
The first mode, a cross-border transaction, occurs where the service
provider, located in country A, provides a service to a consumer in
country B, while both provider and consumer remain present in their
respective countries.235  Such services may be provided through elec-
tronic communications, postal, or parcel services.236  The second mode
occurs where the service provider, located in country A, provides a ser-
vice to a service consumer from country B, and the provider and con-
sumer are both located in country A.237  The third mode applies to the
situation where a service provider from country A establishes a com-
mercial presence in the country of the service consumer, country B,
and then the commercial entity performs the service.238  The fourth
mode describes the circumstances where a service provider from coun-
try A travels to the country of the service consumer, country B, and
then performs the service.239  Because market access is a specific com-
233 Id.
234 CHOW & SCHOENBAUM, supra note 65, at 279; GATS, supra note 104, pt. I, art.
I:1–2.
235 See GATS, supra note 104, pt. I, art. I:2(a).
236 CHOW & SCHOENBAUM, supra note 65, at 279.  Example services include the
receipt of “consultancy or market research reports, telemedical advice, distance
training, or architectural drawings,” id. at 280.
237 See GATS, supra note 104, pt. I, art. I:2(b).  This scenario occurs when
“[n]ationals of [country B] have moved abroad as tourists, students, or patients to
consume the respective services,” CHOW & SCHOENBAUM, supra note 65, at 280.
238 See GATS, supra note 104, pt. I, art. I:2(c).  “The service is provided . . . [in
country B] by a locally-established affiliate, subsidiary, or representative office of
a foreign-owned and –controlled company (bank, hotel group, construction com-
pany, etc.),” CHOW & SCHOENBAUM, supra note 65, at 280.  This also includes a
representative of an energy company.
239 See GATS, supra note 104, pt. I, art. I:2(d).  A foreign national [from country A]
provides a service within [country B] as an independent supplier (e.g., consultant,
health worker) or employee of a service supplier (e.g., consultancy firm, hospital,
construction company), CHOW & SCHOENBAUM, supra note 65, at 280.  This also
includes an independent supplier or employee of an energy company.
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mitment, for Article XVI obligations to apply to their fullest extent, the
service (1) must be included on the country’s Schedule and (2) the
country must not exercise its right to place terms, limitations, and con-
ditions on the modes of supply associated with that service.240
When market access obligations are uninhibited by terms, limi-
tations, or conditions, the obligations prohibit a country from placing
limits on: the number of service suppliers; the value of service transac-
tions; the amount of services’ output; the number of natural persons
employed; the type of legal entity required for operation; and the value
of foreign capital.241
VII. PROPOSED SOLUTION—THE WAY FORWARD
WTO agreements, if used properly, are the means by which the
United States can lead a global trek toward energy security.  The WTO
provides the foundation and infrastructure for multilateral represen-
tation,242 open communication channels,243 and an established dispute
resolution forum244 on which energy security can be built.  The GATT
and GATS provide the tools and guidelines necessary to shape multi-
lateral agreements to promote energy security.
A new entity dedicated to energy security is not required when
we have the necessary vehicle already available.  Perhaps we need to
ask ourselves: would a carpenter want to invent a new type of hammer
when the one he already uses is time-tested and proven through expe-
rience?  Immediate action using the tools at our disposal is re-
quired.245  Returning to the Council on Foreign Relations Task Force
Report246 (CFR Report) and the International Energy Agency’s (“IEA”)
elements247 of energy security, the following discussion uses GATT
and GATS to support these elements.
240 CHOW & SCHOENBAUM, supra note 65, at 285; GATS, supra note 104, pt. III,
art. XVI.
241 CHOW & SCHOENBAUM, supra note 65, at 285.
242 UNDERSTANDING, supra note 64, at 10.
243 See id. at 9.
244 Id. at 10.
245 See CFR REPORT, supra note 12, at 4; see also Mandelson, supra note 38 (advo-
cating for trade policy to take a leading role in energy security); Susan L. Sakmar,
Bringing Energy Trade Into the WTO: The Historical Context, Current Status, and
Potential Implications for the Middle East Region, 18 IND. INT’L & COMP. L. REV.
89, 90 (2008) (stating that “a push for freer trade in those energy services already
within the current Doha Development Agenda (Doha Round) has already
occurred.”).
246 See generally CFR REPORT, supra note 12.
247 See generally IEA OUTLOOK 2007, supra note 22, at 161–62.
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A. Reduce Energy Consumption Through Trade
First, the IEA and the CFR Report recommend that the United
States adjust its domestic energy policy to include efforts to mitigate
demand growth and reduce energy consumption.248  One way to re-
duce consumption is to foster new technologies and to improve existing
technologies.  Through the MFN and national treatment principles,
the GATT works to encourage trade in goods.  If products that contain
new and energy-conserving technologies are subject to GATT, it fol-
lows that such products will have the best chance for widespread use
by consumers.  As more of these products enter the marketplace, com-
petition among products will lead to innovation.  New products born
out of the competition will subsequently enter international commerce.
Member countries have the responsibility to include energy products
on their tariff Schedules and to keep tariff rates low to promote fair
trade and the free flow of such products.
Working in conjunction with GATT, GATS will ensure the
availability of the many diverse services required for this innovation.
GATS market access commitments are a key component of the liberali-
zation of trade in services.249  Education services are required to grow
students into the next generation of engineers, researchers, and scien-
tists.  Training is required to ensure the proper use of available tech-
nologies.  Research and development are needed to foster new products
and technologies.  Manufacturing, construction, and product imple-
mentation are necessary to bring the technology and products to the
user.  These services activities are exactly what the GATS drafters had
in mind when composing the four modes of supply.
Two events must happen to allow GATS to be used to its fullest
extent.  First, the energy services negotiations currently held under
the DDA must incorporate a wide range of energy services.  The
United States proposal of W/120 energy service sector additions should
be adopted because it is the most comprehensive proposal available.250
Such categories and services must be available to Member countries to
include on their GATS Schedules.  Second, as countries include energy
services on their Schedules, they must keep the modes of supply as
unencumbered as possible.  To be sure, the modes of supply play a cru-
cial role within the trade in services.  Exceptions and limitations that
may be placed on the modes must be kept to a minimum.  The road to
energy security is already arduous; each limitation placed on the
modes acts to make the road steeper.
248 See CFR REPORT, supra note 12, at 6; IEA OUTLOOK 2007, supra note 22, at
162.
249 See GATS, supra note 104, pt. II, art. IV.
250 See generally Communication from the United States, supra note 84.
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In addition to market access, the national treatment principle
plays a leading role.  The principle must be enforced to prevent inter-
nal taxes and internal charges that act as trade barriers to imported
goods and services.  While the GATT prohibits a Member country from
imposing conditions and qualifications on the national treatment prin-
ciple,251 the GATS has no such rule.  Therefore, it is up to Member
countries to refrain from imposing these conditions and qualifications.
B. Transparent and Predictable Energy Markets
Second, the IEA and the CFR Report encourage the United
States to work toward a more efficient, transparent, and fair world
energy market.  Regulations, tariffs, and subsidies must be used in a
responsible manner so that market operations are uninhibited.  The
WTO does not advocate for the complete elimination of trade barriers
(such as tariffs and subsidies) but it does support efforts to reduce
trade barriers, ensure non-discrimination, and increase market trans-
parency and predictability.  The basic economic laws of supply and de-
mand must be allowed to govern the market.
Transparency of Member countries’ laws, regulations, rules,
and procedures governing trade will bring fairness to the market.  The
GATT and GATS already incorporate articles addressing transparency
of laws, policies, and regulations.  Member countries must support
these articles through the openness of their lawmaking, rulemaking,
and enforcement mechanisms.
The United States Federal Energy Regulatory Commission
(FERC) has set the bar for transparency.  FERC is an independent
agency within the federal government whose overall mission is to en-
sure the availability of reliable, efficient, and sustainable energy ser-
vices to consumers.252  Its duties include the regulation of the
transmission and wholesale sale of electricity, the regulation of natu-
ral gas transmission and interstate sales, and the regulation of energy
markets.253  Its guiding principles include due process, transparency,
and regulatory certainty.254  In support of its principles, the FERC
251 See GATT, supra note 100, pt. II, art. III.
252 United States Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, About FERC, http://
www.ferc.gov/about/about.asp (last visited Nov. 16, 2009) [hereinafter FERC].
253 FERC, About FERC - What FERC Does, http://www.ferc.gov/about/ferc-does.
asp (last visited Nov. 16, 2009).
254 FERC, supra note 252.  The agency’s Guiding Principles include:
Due Process and Transparency – Paramount in all of its proceed-
ings is the Commission’s determination to be open and fair to all
participants.
Regulatory Certainty – In each of the thousands of orders, opin-
ions and reports issued by the Commission each year, the Com-
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makes its rules, regulations, statutes, court opinions, and orders avail-
able through its website “eLibrary” application to anyone, free of
charge.255  Member countries may use FERC as a template for their
own energy regulatory agencies.
C. Reliable and Secure Infrastructure Through Trade
Third, the IEA and the report advocate for a reliable and se-
cure energy infrastructure.  Infrastructure is critical in all facets of the
energy cycle because energy is useless if one cannot move it from the
seller to the consumer.  The application of GATT and GATS here is
similar to the first recommendation.  Products and services are re-
quired to make infrastructure improvements and therefore the free
movement of such products and services is necessary.
The electricity transmission and distribution grid is one exam-
ple of an infrastructure improvement that requires immediate atten-
tion.  The goal is to remake the current transmission and distribution
grid into a “Smart Grid.”256  In simple terms, the Smart Grid is de-
fined as the incorporation of information technology concepts into the
grid.257  So-called smart meters will be able to collect data regarding
electricity usage, down to the individual household appliance, and pre-
sent this information to both the consumer and utility provider.258
Distribution systems will notify the utility of an outage without the
utility relying on customer complaints.259  The grid will be able to rer-
oute electricity around interruptions to minimize outages.260  One
other major advantage of the smart grid will be its ability to incorpo-
rate and manage electricity generation from highly-variable genera-
tion resources such as wind turbines and solar power facilities.261
These non-constant sources of electricity are valued for their low
environmental impact but can stress the grid in that there may be ca-
pacity but no demand and vice versa.262  When implemented, the
mission strives to provide regulatory certainty through
consistent approaches and actions.
Id.
255 FERC, eLibrary, http://www.ferc.gov/docs-filing/elibrary.asp (last visited Nov.
16, 2009).  Other statutes and orders are located on the FERC website under the
“Legal Resources” webpage, see FERC, Legal Resources webpage, http://www.ferc.
gov/legal/legal.asp (last visited Nov. 16, 2009).
256 FERC, Smart Grid, http://www.ferc.gov/industries/electric/indus-act/smart-
grid.asp (last visited Nov. 16, 2009).
257 Id.; see also Wiser Wires; Smart Grids, ECONOMIST, Oct. 10, 2009, at 71.
258 Wiser Wires; Smart Grids, supra note 257, at 71–72.
259 Id. at 71.
260 Id.
261 Id. at 72.
262 Id.
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smart grid will allow consumers, electric utilities, transmission opera-
tors, and generators to combine their efforts to ensure the availability
of safe, reliable, reasonably priced, and environmentally friendly
electricity.263
D. Political Stability Through Energy Security and Trade
Next, the CFR Report calls on the United States to insist on
energy-exporting countries to manage revenue derived from energy in
a wise and prudent fashion.264  Good governance of income will foster
political stability and enhance living standards.265  One argument
made in the report is that increased transparency of government ac-
counting of energy revenues will make corruption easier to recog-
nize.266  As corruption is recognized and eliminated, a more
responsible government will emerge.267
Another comparable argument can be made that trade in en-
ergy products and services will foster a less corrupt and more stable
government.  It is well known that trade promotes economic develop-
ment.268  Power, especially electricity, is the lifeblood of economic de-
velopment because without it most factories cannot operate.269  By
opening up the trade in energy and energy services, adequate and reli-
able electricity can be made available to those developing countries
that need it.270  A reliable supply of electricity invites investors to in-
vest their capital in developing countries.271  Investments and energy
security are a condition precedent to job growth; job growth leads to a
more stable political situation.272
263 Clever, but Unprincipled; Smart Grids, ECONOMIST, Oct. 10, 2009, at 15–16.
264 CFR REPORT, supra note 12, at 10.
265 Id.
266 Id.
267 Id.
268 See UNDERSTANDING, supra note 64, at 12.
269 Emily Wax, Developing World’s Energy Needs Set Stage for Fight, WASH. POST,
Sept. 9, 2009, at A01 (stating that “[a] factory in Nigeria was forced to relocate
because the cost and scarcity of electricity made it impossible to turn a profit.”).
270 Id. (stating that “[d]eveloping nations’ urgent need for more energy has become
a central issue this year . . . .”).
271 A lack of reliable electricity causes “[f]oreign investors [to] become wary of
parking their money in Africa . . . ,” id.
272 “The shortage of power stymies industrial growth and the resultant job oppor-
tunities, which can destabilize fragile governments in some of the poorest parts of
the world,” id.;see also THE ORGANIZATION FOR SECURITY AND CO-OPERATION IN
EUROPE, ENERGY SECURITY AS A PREREQUISITE FOR POLITICAL STABILITY 1, July 9,
2005, http://www.osce.org/documents/fry/2005/09/16189_en.pdf (last visited Nov.
16, 2009) (stating that ”[t]he political stability of a country is linked with the sus-
tainability of its economic development, which is closely related to the reliability of
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E. Personnel Knowledgeable in Trade Policy
Last, the CRR Report challenges the United States to revamp
its National Security Staff to include a new energy security directorate
that will handle energy specific issues.273  Energy issues are both tech-
nical and complex and having the personnel with the expertise to han-
dle such issues will greatly help the policy making process.274  These
same personnel need to have an understanding of the primary role
that trade can play in achieving our energy security goals.
Another challenge facing the United States is the domestic im-
plementation of WTO agreements.275  The executive and legislative
branches of the federal government must find a way to coordinate
their efforts.  Trade negotiations, headed by the United States Trade
Representative,276 and any energy policy legislation must complement
each other to be effective.
VIII. CONCLUSION
Energy security remains an elusive goal for not only the devel-
oping countries, but also the developed countries.  Energy, while it still
claims its national security asset status, is manageable under the cor-
rect legal regime.  WTO agreements and principles are the tools at our
disposal that must be employed to implement a legal regime for energy
goods and services.  This legal regime gives a country the best chance
at achieving energy security.  Energy security, economic prosperity,
and political stability are within reach.
access to energy resources.  This implies that access to stable sources of energy is
one prerequisite for state stability.”).
273 CFR REPORT, supra note 12, at 10.
274 Id.
275 CHOW & SCHOENBAUM, supra note 65, at 103.
276 “[The United States Trade Representative] is the chief official of the Executive
Branch with respect to international trade,” id.
